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Abstract: There has been a wealth of recent work deriving optimal monetary
policy utilising New Neo-Classical Synthesis (NNCS) models based on nominal
inertia. Such models typically abstract from the impact of monetary policy
on the government’s ﬁnances, by assuming that consumers are inﬁnitely-lived
and taxes are lump-sum such that Ricardian Equivalence holds. In this paper,
in the context of a sticky-price NNCS model, we assume that the government
must adjust spending and/or distortionary taxation to satisfy its intertemporal
budget constraint. We then consider optimal monetary and ﬁscal policies under
discretion and commitment in the face of technology, preference and cost-push
shocks. We ﬁnd that the optimal precommitment policy implies a random walk
in the steady-state level of debt, generalising earlier results that involved only a
single ﬁscal instrument. In the case of negative ﬁscal shocks this implies perma-
nently higher taxation and lower output and government spending to support
the new steady-state debt stock, but the optimal combination of these variables
will ensure a zero rate of inﬂation under commitment. We also ﬁnd that the
time-inconsistency in the optimal precommitment policy is such that govern-
ments are tempted, given inﬂationary expectations, to raise taxation to reduce
the ultimate debt burden they need to service. Since taxation is a distortionary
labour income tax, this aggressive raising of taxation raises ﬁrms’ marginal costs
and fuels inﬂation. We show that this temptation is only eliminated if following
shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original, ﬁrst-best, debt level.
This implies that under discretionary policy the random walk result is over-
turned: debt will always be returned to this initial steady-state even although
there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. In a
series of numerical simulations we show that the welfare consequences of intro-
ducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be signiﬁcant for
discretionary policy.
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1O v e r v i e w
There has been a wealth of recent work deriving optimal monetary policy util-
ising New Neo-Classical Synthesis (NNCS) models. Such models introduce a
stabilisation role for monetary policy by assuming a nominal friction, often in
the form of overlapping price contracts of the Cavlo (1983) type. This friction
implies the optimal rate of inﬂation is typically close to zero to avoid exacerbat-
ing the welfare costs of relative price distortions1. However, such models usually
only introduce ﬁscal policy as a convenient device through which to ensure the
steady-state is eﬃcient, ignoring the impact of monetary policy on the govern-
ment’s ﬁnances. Monetary policy can aﬀect the government’s budget constraint
through various channels - through siegniorage, by aﬀecting debt service costs,
and by aﬀecting the size of the tax base and need for ﬁscal transfers when prices
are sticky. Most monetary policy models typically abstract from such eﬀects,
by assuming that consumers are inﬁnitely-lived and taxes are lump-sum such
that Ricardian Equivalence holds.
In this paper we relax this assumption and, in the context of a NNCS model,
require that the government must adjust spending and/or distortionary taxa-
tion to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint. We then consider optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policies under discretion and commitment in the face of
technology, preference and cost-push shocks and assess the extent to which ig-
noring the ﬁscal consequences of monetary policy aﬀects the usual description
of optimal monetary policy. Papers which do introduce debt and distortionary
taxes to this model include Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004), however, in both cases they consider commitment policies,
whereas we also focus of the nature of the time-inconsistency problem and its
implication for discretionary policy-making. The time-inconsistency problem
in this context is particularly relevant given that policy makers are prepared
to place quite tough constraints on their ﬁscal policies (see for example, the
Stability and Growth Pact) and these constraints are often far from credible.
We ﬁnd that the optimal precommitment policy implies a random walk in
the steady-state level of debt, generalising earlier results that involved only a sin-
gle ﬁscal instrument. However, our analysis of the time-inconsistency problem
reveals that governments are, in the face of negative ﬁscal shocks and existing
inﬂationary expectations, tempted to raise taxes to reduce the future burden
of servicing the debt stock. These higher taxes will raise labour costs and fuel
1This is in contrast to the ﬂexible price literature where optimal monetary policy is typically
described by the Friedman rule which involves a steady deﬂation which underpins a nominal
interest rate of zero.
2inﬂation which will also serve to reduce the debt stock through surprise inﬂa-
tion. However, even if debt is real this temptation to raise taxes beyond their
precommitment level, given economic agents expectations, remains. This im-
plies that, under discretionary policy debt will always be returned to its initial
steady-state to eliminate this temptation, and debt no longer follows a random
walk. In adding debt to the New Keynesian model, the problem with discre-
tionary policy (relative to commitment) is not that it fails to stabilise the debt
stock, but that it is overzealous in doing so. In a series of numerical simulations
we show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for
precommitment policies, but can be signiﬁcant for discretionary policy.
There has been previous work examining time-consistency problems in the
presence of debt, although this has been in models based on ﬂexible prices -
t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h es u r p r i s ei n ﬂation is not merely used to oﬀset the ﬁscal
eﬀects of shocks then a potential time-inconsistency problem exists. However,
this time-inconsistency problem need not imply a postive inﬂation bias, but
can be consistent with the Friedman rule (Obstfeld, 1991,1997), or, for alterna-
tive preferences, a positive steady-state debt level where the time-inconsistency
problem has been eliminated (Ellison and Rankin (2006)). Nevertheless, given
that optimal monetary policy results under ﬂexible prices, such as the Friedman
rule, are not robust to the introduction of sticky prices, it is important to extend
this analysis to the case of sticky prices and distortionary taxes.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline our model in
which consumers supply labour to imperfectly competitive ﬁrms who are only
able to change prices at random intervals of time. Workers’ labour income
is taxed. In Section 3 we derive a second-order approximation to welfare for
t h e s ec o n s u m e r s . T h i si si m p o r t a n ts i n c et h ee ﬀective rejection of the Fried-
man rule in sticky-price models relies on the dominance of the welfare costs of
price-distortions relative to the costs reducing the inﬂation tax. We eliminate
the usual inﬂationary bias caused by an ineﬃciently low level of steady-state
output due to imperfect competition and distortionary taxes, by introducing a
subsidy ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes. However, we do not allow further use of
lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance government spending and ensure ﬁscal solvency fol-
lowing shocks - instead governments must adjust spending and/or income taxes
to ensure ﬁscal sustainability. This allows us to focus on the time inconsistency
caused by the need to stabilise debt. In Section 4, we describe the optimal
precommitment policy and analyse the time-inconsistency inherent in that pol-
icy, before computing the discretionary policy in Section 5. This then informs
the simulation results in section 6, which reveal that operating under discretion
overturns the usual random walk result and can potentially generate signiﬁcant
welfare costs.
2 The Model
This section outlines our model. We examine the households’ problem initially,
before turning to the ﬁrms’ problem.
32.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one, who diﬀer in that they provide
diﬀerentiated labour services to ﬁrms in their economy. However, we shall as-
sume full asset markets, such that, through risk sharing, they will face the same









where C,G and N are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate, and
labour supply respectively, and ξ is a time preference shock and ξ
N
t is a labour
supply shock.









where j denotes the good’s type or variety. The public goods aggregate takes









The elasticity of substitution between varieties ²t > 1 is time varying as we wish
to allow for cost-push/mark-up shocks.
The budget constraint at time t is given by
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Πt + Dt + WtNt(1 − τt) − Tt (4)
where Pt(j) is the price of variety j , Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio
held at the end of period t, Π is the representative household’s share of proﬁts
in the imperfectly competitive ﬁrms, W are wages, τ is an wage income tax
rate, and T are lump sum taxes. Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one
period ahead payoﬀs.
Households must ﬁrst decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure
across the various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share
of a particular good in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price dif-
ferences - this minimises the costs of consumption. Optimisation of expenditure












2We drop the time subscript when all variables in an expression are dated in the same
period and there is no possibility of confusion.
4It follows that Z 1
0
P(j)C(j)dj = PC (7)
The budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Dt + WtNt(1 − τt) − Tt (8)
2.1.1 Households’ Intertemporal Consumption Problem
The ﬁrst of the households intertemporal problems involves allocating consump-





























We can then maximise utility subject to the budget constraint (8) to obtain






















where Rt = 1
Et{Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying
oﬀ a unit of currency in t +1 . This is the familiar consumption Euler equation
which implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption over time
such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods (after
allowing for tilting due to interest rates diﬀering from the households’ rate of
time preference).
A log-linearised version of (11) can be written as
b Ct +b ξt = Et{b Ct+1 +b ξt+1} −
1
σ
(rt − Et{πt+1}) (12)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from steady-state, rt =
Rt − ρ where ρ = 1
β − 1,a n dπt = pt − pt−1 is price inﬂation.









ln(1 − b τ)+b w = ϕ b N + σ b C +b ξ
N
(14)
52.2 Allocation of Government Spending
The allocation of government spending across goods is determined by minimising
total costs,
R 1







The production function is linear, so for ﬁrm j
Y (j)=AN(j) (16)
where a =l n ( A) is time varying and stochastic. While the demand curve they


























where κ is an employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate the steady-
state distortion associated with monopolistic competition and distortionary in-
come taxes (assuming there is a lump-sum tax available to ﬁnance such a sub-





































Solving for the optimal reset price, which is common across all ﬁrms able to

































6Appendix 1 then details the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
for price inﬂation which is given by,
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1 − θpβ)(1 − θp)
θp
(c mct + b µt) (23)
where c mc = −a+ b w−b v are the real log-linearised marginal costs of production,
b µt =l n ( ²t
²t−1)−ln( ²
²−1)is a mark-up shock representing the temporary deviation
of the desired markup from its steady-state value, and v = −ln(1 − κ) is a
transformation of the steady-state production subsidy. In the absence of sticky
prices proﬁt maximising behaviour implies, mct = −ln(µt) where µt is the
desired mark-up. Using the labour supply condition, ln(1−b τ)+b w = ϕb n+σb c+b ξ
N
,
we can rewrite this as,
πt = βEtπt+1 + γ(−at + ϕb nt + σb ct +b ξ
N
t − b vt − ln(1 − b τt)+b µt) (24)
where γ =
(1−θpβ)(1−θp)
θp . From the production funcion,
πt = βEtπt+1 + γ(−(1 + ϕ)at + ϕb yt + σb ct +b ξ
N
t − b vt − ln(1 − b τt)+b µt) (25)
2.4 Equilibrium
Goods market clearing requires, for each good j,
Y (j)=C(j)+G(j) (26)




)−²t[C + G] (27)









allows us to write
Y = C + G (29)
Log-linearising implies
b Y = θ b C +( 1− θ)b G (30)
w h e r ew ed e ﬁne θ = C
Y .
72.5 Government Budget Constraint
Recall the representative consumer’s budget constraint,
PtCt + Et{Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Πt + Dt + WtNt(1 − τt) − Tt (31)
Dt+1 is a random variable, whose value depends on the state of the world in
period t +1i.e. it is the household’s planned state-contingent wealth. There is
a unique stochastic discount factor which has the property,
At = Et[Qt,t+1Dt+1] (32)
where At is the end-of period nominal value of the household’s portfolio of
assets. If the household chooses to hold only risk-less one period bonds then
this condition becomes,
Dt+1 = RtAt
However, households will not only hold government bonds as they will wish to
hold a complete set of contingent assets (given the stickiness in wage and price





Et+1[Qt+1,T(ΠT + WTNT(1 − τT) − TT)] (33)
with certainty, no matter what state of the world emerges. These series of bor-
rowing constraints and ﬂow budget constraints then deﬁnes the intertemporal
budget constraint. It is normal to rule out no-Ponzi schemes which amount to,
∞ X
T=t
Et[Qt,T(ΠT + W(k)TN(k)T(1 − τT) − TT)] < ∞ (34)
at each point in time across all possible states of the world. These can be
combined to yield the intertemporal budget constraint (see Woodford, 2003,
chapter 2, page 69),
∞ X
T=t
Et[PTCT] ≤ Dt +
∞ X
T=t
Et[Qt,T(ΠT + WTNT(1 − τT) − TT)] (35)
Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
PY = WN + Π − κWN (36)




Et[Qt,T(PTYT − PTCT − WTNT(τT − κ) − TT)] (37)




Et[Qt,T(PTGT − WTNT(τT − κ) − Ti)] (38)
In order to focus on the time-inconsistency problem associated with the intro-
duction of debt and distortionary taxation to the NNCS model we introduce a
steady-state subsidy (which oﬀsets, in steady-state, the distortions caused by
distortionary taxation and imperfect competition in wage and price setting).
This subsidy is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation and removes the usual desire on
the part of policy makers to raise output above its natural level to compensate
for these distortions. We shall then assume that lump-sum taxation cannot
be used to alter this subsidy or to ﬁnance any other government activities, in-
cluding the kind of spending and distortionary tax adjustments as stabilisation
measures we are interested in. This implies that Wi
TNi
Tκi = Ti
T in all our










i.e. distortionary taxation and spending adjustments are required to service















































Log-linearising around this steady-state,
b bt−1 − πt = βEt{b bt − πt+1} +[
wNτ
b





3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
In order to derive a welfare function for policy analysis we proceed in the fol-
lowing manner. Firstly, we consider the social planner’s problem. We then
contrast this with the outcome under ﬂexible prices in order to determine the
level of the steady-state subsidy required to ensure the model’s steady-state is
socially optimal. Finally, we construct a quadratic approximation to utility in
our sticky-price/distortionary tax economy which assesses the extent to which
endogenous variables diﬀer from the ﬂex-price equilibrium due to the nominal
inertia and tax distortions present in the model.
The social planner is not constrained by the price mechanism and simply
decides how to allocate consumption and production of goods within the econ-
omy. Since the social planner will produce equal quantities of all goods we can
write the production technology as
Y = AN (45)
and the resource constraint,
Y = C + G (46)




























































where we introduce the ‘*’ superscript to denote the eﬃcient steady-state level
of that variable. These can be log-linearised around this steady-state as,
−σ b C∗
t − σb ξt = ϕb Y ∗
t − (1 + ϕ)at + ϕb ξt (53)
and,
b C∗
t = b G∗
t (54)
where we a mesauring the optimal deviation of the variable from the eﬃcient
steady-state in the face of shocks. From the national accounting identity the
latter implies, b C∗
t = b G∗
t = b Y ∗
t .
103.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium
Proﬁt-maximising behaviour implies that ﬁrms will operate at the point at which





























If the subsidy κ is given by
(1 − κ)=( 1−
1
²







which is identical to the optimal level of employment in the eﬃcient steady-state
derived above. If the government implements the govt spending plans in line
with the social planner’s problem in steady-state then the ﬂex price steady-state
i st h es a m ea st h ee ﬃcient output level.
From the labour supply condition, if the subsidy is in place, then the steady-





























This is enough to deﬁne all log-linearised relationships dependent on model
parameters and the initial debt to gdp ratio.
113.3 Social Welfare








t{σθ(b Ct − b C∗
t )2 +σ(1 − θ)( b Gt − b G∗






+tip + O[3] (64)
It contains quadratic terms in price inﬂation reﬂecting the costs of price disper-
sion induced by inﬂation in the presence of nominal inertia, as well as terms in
the consumption, government spending and output gaps i.e. the diﬀerence be-
tween the actual value of the variable and its optimal value under ﬂexible prices.
The weights attached to each element are a function of deep model parameters.
The key to obtaining this quadratic speciﬁcation is in adopting an employment
subsidy which eliminates the steady-state distortions caused by imperfect com-
petition in labour and product markets as well as the steady-state impact of a
distortionary income tax. It is important to stress that this subsidy only applies
in the steady-state such that it cannot be used as a policy instrument to either
stabilise the economy or the government’s ﬁnances in the face of shocks.
3.4 Gap variables
We have derived welfare based on various gaps, so we now proceed to rewrite
our model in terms of the same gap variables to facilitate derivation of optimal
policy. The consumption Euler equation can be written in gap form as,
(b Ct − b C∗















the natural rate of interest. (This comes from the fact that b C∗
t = b Y ∗
t and the
deﬁnition of the eﬃcient level of output).
W h i l et h eN K P Cc a nb ew r i t t e na s ,





b τt + µt) (66)
Using the deﬁnition of eﬃcient output this can be written,
πt = βEtπt+1 + γ(ϕ(b Yt − b Y ∗




b τt + µt) (67)
and, followimg Benigno and Woodford (2003) we can deﬁne, τ
1−τ b τ
∗
t = µt .I n
other words we are deﬁning our ‘eﬃcient’ tax rate as the tax rate required to
perfectly oﬀset the impact of a cost-push shock3. If we had access to a lump-
sum tax to ﬁnance the budget deﬁcit then this would be the optimal tax rate.
3It should be noted that we could deﬁne the tax ‘gap’ as being the actual tax rate relative
to any benchmark tax rate we choose, such as, for example, the initial steady-state tax rate.
However, it is convenient to deﬁne the gap relative to the tax rate which oﬀsets the impact of
a cost-push shock on inﬂation.
12However, given the need to ﬁnance the government liabilities through distor-
tionary taxation, actual tax rates are likely to deviate from the level required
to prefectly oﬀset shocks and the Phillips curve can be rewritten as,
πt = βEtπt+1 + γ(ϕ(b Yt − b Y ∗




(b τt − b τ
∗
t)) (68)
Appendix 4 rewrites the budget constraint constraint in gap form as,
b bt−1 − πt = βEt{b bt − πt+1} + pst (69)














(b Gt− b G∗
t)−ft (70)








b µt capturing the extent to which the
various shocks hitting our model have ﬁscal consequences.
4 Precommitment Policy
In this section we shall consider the precommitment policies for our model.
The Lagrangian associated with the policy problem under commitment in the
































































t+s are the lagrange multipliers associated with the
NKPC, the resource constraint and the government’s budget constraint respec-
tively. To simplify notation we have rewritten the gap variables in the form,
x
g
t = b Xt − b X∗
t .
We shall initially consider the ﬁrst-order conditions for periods s>0 which
apply in the same form whether or not we consider optimal or timeless com-
mitment. The diﬀerences between these two forms of commitment which hinge
on policy behaviour in the initial period s =0 , and will be considered in detail
below. Accordingly, the ﬁrst-order conditions from this optimisation are given


































































The foc for debt implies that the lagrange-multiplier for debt follows a ran-
dom walk and this will underpin the random walk for debt result derived below.
Combining this foc with the foc for inﬂation and the tax rate implies that, in
the absence of new information, inﬂation is zero. From the NKPC, this in turn











Solving the remaining focs implies the following relationships between gapped
































(ϕ + σ) θ









The constancy of these various real gaps implies that monetary policy is set such
that interest rates are consistent with the natural rate of interest. It is clear
14from these deﬁnitions that the coeﬃcients, ai,i =1 ,2,3 are positive provided











< (ϕ + σ)(






< (σ + ϕ) (83)
For plausible steady-state debt/GDP ratios all variants of this condition will
hold4, implying that that when λ
b






t+s will all be negative,
which implies that τ
g
t+s > 0.The converse is true when λ
b
t < 0.
It is helpful to rewrite the the deﬁnition of the primary surplus, (70), in
terms of the value of the lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s












t+s − (1 − θ)g
g
t+s] − ft+s (84)
Using the expressions relating the gap variables to the lagrange-multiplier this
can be re-written as,
pst+s = Ψλ
b
t − ft+s (85)
where Ψ =( B
Y )−1[(ϕ − τ
1−τ )a1 + σa2 +( 1− θ)a3] > 0, again for debt not too
large5.
4.1 Timelessly Optimal Policy
Under the timelessly optimal policy we can impose the same policy in the initial
period, so that, from (85) and noting that inﬂation is zero under this policy, the
government budget constraint will evolve according to,




























4For the parmater values adopted in the simulation section below, the annualised steady-
state debt to GDP ratio would have to exceed 2812.5% for this condition to be violated.
5For the parameter values adopted in the simulation section below it is not possible for
this coeﬃcient to be negative for any positive debt to gdp ratio.
15In other words the lagrange multiplier is proportional to the initial debt dise-
quilibrium and the discounted value of any ﬁscal deterioriation implied by the
various shocks expected to hit the economy. The new steady-state government
surplus will be given by (85) implying, in the absence of further unexpected













i.e. there is a random walk in the steady-state of debt under the timelessly opti-
mal precommitment policy, such that the debt stock fully incorporates the ﬁscal
consequences of shocks. The permanent changes in taxation and government
spending that occur under the timelessly optimal policy do not attempt to undo
the ﬁscal consequences of shocks, but merely ensure that this new steady-state
debt to gdp ratio is sustainable.
To summarise, the consequences of shocks for the welfare-relevant gap vari-
ables under the timelessly optimal policy depend solely on their ﬁscal impact.
Monetary policy ensures that nominal interest rates are consistent with the nat-
ural rate of interest. Fiscal policy then oﬀsets any cost-push shocks, but can
only do so imperfectly because of the need to satisfy the intertemporal budget
constraint. Both policies jointly ensure that inﬂation is always zero, but ﬁscal
instruments have to be adjusted to ensure solvency. The optimal policy is to
allow the ﬁscal eﬀects of shocks to be fully reﬂected in the debt stock and to
only adjust ﬁscal instruments (government spending gaps and the tax gap) to
the extent required to support the new steady-state debt stock.
4.2 Commitment Policy and Time-Inconsistency
In this section we consider the case where the policy maker exploits the fact
that expectations are given in the initial period. By contrasting the solution in
the initial period to that which follows we can highlight the nature of the time-
inconsistency problem facing policy makers, which will help generate intuition
for the outcome under discretion. In the initial period, s =0 ,a s s u m i n gw ea r e
not imposing the timelessly optimal policy, the initial values of the lagrange
multipliers associated with the problem will be zero. Since the only foc which
is dynamic in the lagrange multipliers is that for inﬂation, in the initial period











t is the lagrange-multiplier associated with the government’s budget
constraint under optimal (non-timeless) commitment where j =r e a l ,nom de-








16This captures the extent to which ﬁscal stress generates inﬂation in the initial
period. (Note that if debt was real rather than nominal there would still be a
time inconsistency problem implying inﬂation in the initial period is still given
by this expression, although the size of the lagrangian associated with the budget
constraint will be diﬀerent - see below.)



















implying that the initial period’s inﬂation rate is given by,(wN
b +γ)e λ
b,j
t .I n o t h e r
words, in the initial period, given inﬂationary expectations, the ﬁscal authorities
are tempted to move the tax instrument by more than is necessary to simply
support a steady-state debt stock that fully reﬂects the ﬁscal consequences of the
shocks. This moves the steady-state debt stock closer to its optimal value. By
d o i n gs ot h eﬁscal authorities reduce the costs of servicing the ultimate steady-
state debt stock, but the initial changes in the tax instrument also generates
additional unexpected inﬂation. Given this behaviour in the initial period, the
initial government surplus is given by,
pst = Ψ0e λ
b.j
t − ft (93)






y)2 > Ψ. Therefore, when
e λ
b,j
t > 0 taxes rise in the initial period, fueling inﬂation, taxes then fall back to a
level which is still above their initial steady-state value while output, consump-
tion and government spending have all fallen relative to their original steady-
state values. Note that this inﬂation is a ﬁscal phenomenon in the sense that
higher taxes raise marginal costs, causing inﬂation, while monetary policy will
ensure that interest rates are in line with the natural rate of interest and are,
in that sense, neither inﬂationary nor deﬂationary.
In order to determine the size of the lagrange multiplier assocated with the
government’s IBC, we need to substitute these expressions in the intertemporal
budget constraint. This calculation varies according to whether or not debt is
real or nominal, since in the later case inﬂation in the initial period can deﬂate
the real value of the debt. Accordingly in the case of real debt the lagrange
multiplier is deﬁned by,











and surprise inﬂation will not deﬂate the real value of the debt stock, while in
the case of nominal debt we need to take account of the impact of the initial
period’s inﬂation on the debt stock,











17Using the expression for the initial rate of inﬂation and solving for the lagrange-















In other words the lagrange-multiplier is again proportional to the sum of the
initial debt-disequilibrium and the expected discounted value of the ﬁscal eﬀects
of shocks. However, cet. par. the value of the multiplier will not be as large
when the policy maker exploits ﬁxed expectations in the initial period to raise
additional tax revenue and deﬂate the debt. This implies that, in the case of a
shock with negative ﬁscal consequences, output, consumption and government
spending will not fall by as much, and taxes will not need to rise by as much to
support the new steady-state debt stock, which is lower than it would be under
timelessly optimal policy. The new steady-state debt stock under (non-timeless)




















and since e λ
b,j
t is lower than under the timeless perspective ( λ
b
t), some of the
ﬁscal consequences of the shocks will be undone by the policy implemented in
the ﬁrst period. This will be greater in the case of nominal debt than real debt
since the aggressive ﬁscal policy is even more eﬀective when debt deﬂation is
possible. It is also interesting to note from (91) that inﬂation in the initial
period is lower when debt is nominal as the combined eﬀects of debt deﬂation
and higher taxes moderate the need to raise taxes (and fuel inﬂation) relative
to the case of real debt.
We are now in a position to describe the response to shocks under both forms
of commitment. Shocks only have an eﬀect on welfare-relevant gap variables to
t h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e yh a v eﬁscal repercussions, the ﬁnancing of which limits the
extent to which monetary and ﬁscal policy can achieve the ﬁrst-best solution.
Under timeless commitment inﬂation is always zero. Policy allows the ﬁscal
eﬀe c t so fs h o c k st ob ef u l l yr e ﬂected in the debt stock and to only adjust ﬁscal
instruments (government spending gaps and the tax gap) to the extent required
to support the new steady-state debt stock. Under timeless commitment it
does not matter whether debt is denominate in real or nominal terms. Time
inconsistent (non-timeless) optimal commitment policy improves welfare further
by exploiting the Phillips curve to change taxes and (through higher marginal
costs) inﬂation in the initial period relative to the timeless case, but thereafter
it also adjusts ﬁscal instruments only to the extent required to support the new
steady-state debt stock. The generating of inﬂation in the inirtial period also
means that it matters whether debt is real or nominal. The initial period change
in taxes means that the increase in steady state debt (and associated changes in
other variables) will be less under non-timeless commitment, and will be lower
still when debt is nominal. In both cases, if shocks raise debt, then steady state
18taxes are higher, and steady state government spending, private consumption
and output are all lower. Debt will slowly evolve until it reaches a new steady-
state value consistent with the higher taxes, lower government spending and
reduced consumption and output. The initial increase in taxes and inﬂation
under the time inconsistent policy drives the outcome under discretion.
5 Discretionary Policy
In attempting to obtain the discretionary policy solution we must contend with
the existence of forward and backward-looking constraints. Our model is of
the general linear-quadratic form, by construction. Therefore we can write the
evolution of inﬂation as follows,
















































⎦ are the vectors of state and control
variables respectively.
There is a similar formula describing the evolution of the state variables6,

















































In this simulation section below we consider the impact of diﬀerent shocks with
diﬀerent degrees of persistence. The ﬁrst problem we face is in formulating
6In this section we make the empirically plausible assumption that debt is denominated in
nominal terms.
19a recursive problem when our model contains expectations of future variables.
However, since we have a linear-quadratic formula we can hypothesize a solution
of the form,
πt = FSt−1 (100)
where F =
£
f1 f2 f3 f4
¤
is a 1x4 vector of undeﬁned constants. Leading
this forward one period and utilising the equation describing the evolution of
the state variables, we can write,
FB0πt + FB1bt−1 + FB2ut = A0πt + A1bt−1 + A2ut (101)
Solving for inﬂation,
πt = C1bt−1 + C2ut (102)
where
C1 ≡ [FB0 − A0]
−1[A1−FB1]
and,
C2 ≡ [FB0 − A0]
−1[A2 − FB2]
We can similarly eliminate endogenous variables from the evolution of the state
variables,
St = D1St−1 + D2ut (103)
where
D1 ≡ [B0C1 + B1]
and,
D2 ≡ [B0C2 + B2]






πt = C1St−1 + C2ut (105)
and,


















⎦ so that we now have a fully
recursive formulation of the problem.
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the control variables from this
optimisation are then given by,
2C2





Note that since Q has a middle row and column of zeros, the focs will not contain
any terms in the tax instrument, such that we eﬀectively have three focs in four
20unknowns, πt,y t,gt and Et
∂V (bt)














2Q11 Q1,3 + Q3,1 βN1,1
Q2,1 + Q1,2 Q2,3 + Q3,2 βN2,1
Q1,3 + Q3,1 2Q33 βN3,1
⎤
⎦ and Qi,j denotes the ele-
ment contained in row i,c o l u m nj of matrix Q. This can be solved to yield the
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⎦
Note that the ﬁrst two elements do not depend upon our ‘guess’ parameters,f1..f4,
and imply that there is a linear relationship between the output gap and inﬂa-
tion and between the government spending gap and inﬂation under discretion.
Using the same, plausible, restrictions on the size of the initial debt stock as un-
der commitment above, these relationships will be negative. Therefore a shock
which raises the debt stock will lead to higher inﬂation and lower output and
government spending under discretion. Since lower output, consumption and
government spending would tend to reduce marginal costs, the higher inﬂation
must be fuelled by the tax increases required to control the government debt
since taxation is distortionary and raises labour costs. This contrasts with the
corresponding criteria under commitment which taxes adjust to ensure that in-
ﬂation is zero, while the output gap and government spending adjust to support
the new steady-state level of government debt. It is also the case that raising
t h ed e g r e eo fp r i c eﬂexibility (raising γ) will reduce the adjustment of output
and government spending relative to inﬂation in responding to shocks under
discretion.









Since the state variables relating to the shock process are exogenous, we can
focus on the ﬁrst row of these ﬁrst-order conditions to obtain,
21∂V (bt−1)
∂bt−1








where W ≡[2C11,1R + βD12,1X3,1].






= WF[D1St−1 + D2ut] (113)
substituting back into the focs,
2C2










0R[C1St−1 + C2ut]+(Q+Q0)ut +βD3WF[D1St−1 +D2ut]=0 (115)




0RC2+[Q+Q0]+βD3WFD2] and U2 =[ 2C2
0RC1+βD3WFD1].
The solution for inﬂation is now given as,
πt =[ C1 − C2[U1]
−1U2]St−1 (117)
However, this solution is a function of the undetermined coeﬃcients, f1 and f2,
w h i c hc a nb ed e r i v e db ye q u a t i n gc o e ﬃcients,
F = C1 − C2[U1]
−1U2 (118)
This completes the solution of the problem under discretion. Unfortunately
the analytical solution deﬁned in this way is too unwieldy to yield any real in-
tuition. Nevertheless, after imposing the solved value for the undetermined co-
eﬃcients, we can examine the evolution of the state variables under the optimal
discretionary policy,
St =[ D1 − [U1]
−1U2]St−1 ≡ GSt−1 (119)
22In order for debt to follow a random walk under discretion in the face of non-
permament shocks, the element G1,1 must equal 1. H e r ew ec a np r o v i d ea
proof by counterexample- substitution of the central parameter set utilised in
the simulation section below indicates that G1,1 < 1. In other words, under
discretionary policy debt is eventually returned to its pre-shock level and does
not automatically contain the random walk property as under the commitment
case.
6 Optimal Policy Simulations
In this section we examine the optimal policy response to various shocks. We
consider discretionary and commitment policies and compute the welfare bene-
ﬁts of employing our various ﬁscal instruments as stabilisation devices. In this
section we outline the response of the model to a series of shocks. Following Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2005) we adopt the following parameter set, ϕ =1 , µ =1 .2,
²t =6 , θp =0 .75, β =0 .99, α =0 .4, and 1 − θ =0 .25. The productivity shock
follows the following pattern,
at = ρaat−1 + ξt (120)
where we adopting a degree of persistence in the productivity shock of ρa =0 .99.
We adopt a similar dynamic structure for the labour supply shock, consistent
with the evidence for both forms of shock in Smets and Wouters (2005). Ireland
(2004) ﬁnds similar persistence in the productivity shock, but lower persistence
in the price mark-up shock7 We therefore consider a cost-push shock with a
similar stochastic structure but with a lower degree of persistence, ρµ =0 .9,
which is slightly lower than Ireland’s estimate of 0.96. Of course, if we raise the
persistence of this shock then this will raise the costs relative to the numbers
we compute below.
6.1 Simulations
We then consider the ability of an economy to stabilise the economy following
a productivity shock through the use of ﬁscal instruments when it must also
ensure sustainability of the government’s ﬁnances. Figure 1 details the paths of
key endogenous variables following the technology shock. In the case of timeless
commitment policy, we observe an instantaneous and permanent rise in taxation
and fall in output and government spending, which is suﬃcient to support the
eventual steady-state debt stock without generating inﬂation. This debt stock
fully reﬂects the ﬁscal consequences of shocks. This is the random walk result of
7Smets and Wouters (2005) do not allow for persistence in the cost-push shock.
23Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), generalised
to the case of two ﬁscal instruments, which also has echoes of tax smoothing
(Barro (1979)).
If we then allow policy makers to exploit the fact that expectations are given
in the initial period, then we observe an initial rise in taxation which fuels inﬂa-
tion in the initial period. This actually reduces debt in the initial period, which
allows lower levels of taxation and higher levels of output, government spend-
ing and consumption than would otherwise be the case for beyond the initial
period. However, for this particular shock, the magnitude of these diﬀerence
is small, but can be seen from the graph in the bottom right-hand cell which
compares the path for debt under optimal and timeless commitment in the ﬁrst
two periods.
A more substantial diﬀerence occurs when we consider the discretionary so-
lution. We demonstrated analytically that a time-inconsistency problem existed
whereby negative ﬁscal shocks create an incentive for governments to raise taxes
and, when debt is nominal, to fuel inﬂation to deﬂate the real value of the debt
stock. Under discretion the national ﬁscal authorities, taking future inﬂationary
expectations as given, have this incentive and economic agents incorporate this
into their inﬂation expectations. As a consequence, the ﬁscal authorities are
forced to raise taxes by more than they would under commitment, this fuels
inﬂation, but also serves to reduce the debt initially. (This is in constrast to
the case under commitment where the debt rises throughout the simulation).
Eventually falling output reduces tax revenues, and debt slowly returns to its
ﬁrst-best level where the time-inconsistency problem is eliminated. The dynam-
ics of ﬁscal instruments and debt depend in particular on the persistence of the
shock. However, for empirically plausible measures of persistence, shocks with
negative ﬁscal consequences will imply debt initially falling under discretion,
in stark contrast to the commitment case. If we assumed a substantially less
persistent shock (which is, hwoever, inconsistent with the empirical evidence),
debt would initially increase, but it will always return to its steady state value
under discretion, for reasons discussed above.
Similar responses emerge for other shocks present in the model since it is
o n l yt ot h ee x t e n tt h a ts h o c k sh a v eﬁscal consequences that we cannot use the
mixture of ﬁscal and monetary policy instruments to oﬀset the impact of shocks
on gap variables. These are summarised in the following table.
24Table 1 - Welfare Consequences of Shocks under Alternative Policies.
Discretion Timeless Commitment Commitment
Technology 0.0151% 9.5677x10−4% 9.3498x10−4%
Labour Supply 0.0295% 2.3919x10−4% 2.3374x10−4%
Mark-Up 4.2142% 0.2022% 0.1976%
The welfare implications of these shocks are limited in the case of technology
shocks, with the costs of the technology shock amounting to only 9.3498x10−4%
of one period’s steady-state consumption rate under commitment (with welfare
only marginally lower in the case of timelessly optimal policy) and 0.0151 %
under discretion. Labour supply shocks are similar in magnitude to technology
shocks. However for autocorrelated cost-push shocks the welfare eﬀects can be
substantial under discretion - a 1% shock has a cost of 4.2142% of one period’s
steady-state consumption under discretion, compared with only 0.1976% (and
0.2022%) under commitment (and timelessly optimal commitment). The reason
why the mark-up shock has such dramatic welfare implications is that it cannot
be oﬀset by monetary policy, but requires variations in income tax rates which
have direct ﬁscal consequences. The other shocks can be mitigated through the
use of monetary policy, which has less eﬀect on the government’s ﬁnances.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we examined the ability of ﬁscal and monetary instruments to
oﬀset the eﬀects of various shocks when policymakers did not have access to
lump-sum taxes to balance the budget. We found that this implied, in a simple
New Keynesian framework that the three instruments available to policy makers
could not oﬀset the impact of shocks on welfare relevant gap variables since
the shocks also had an impact on the government’s budget constraint. We
analytically derived commitment policy from the timeless perspective and found
that the steady-state debt stock would fully incorporate the ﬁscal consequences
of shocks and tax and government spending variables would only adjust to
maintain this new steady-state level of debt. Inﬂation would be zero throughout
and monetary policy would ensure that nominal interest rates were consistent
with the natural rate of interest.
We then contrasted the timeless conception of commitment with the more
conventional version where policy makers exploit the fact that expectations are
given in the initial period. This reveals the nature of the time-inconsistency
problem inherent in the commitment solution, whereby the ﬁscal authorities
have the incentive, given expectations, to use taxes more aggressively in the
initial period to reduce the subsequent debt-disequilibrium and the costs asso-
ciated with sustaining a given debt level. In the case of a shock with negative
ﬁscal consequences this will imply that the ﬁscal authorities aggressively raise
taxes in the initial period, raising marginal costs and fueling inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
initial period. This slows the initial rise in the debt stock allowing the new
steady-state debt stock to be supported with lower permanent increases in the
25debt stock, and falls in consumption, output and government spending.
We then turn to the discretionary solution, where governments follow a time
consistent policy. The random walk result no longer holds, and instead debt
gradually returns to its steady state level. Only by returning debt to its steady
state can the incentive to reduce debt noted under commitment be eliminated.
In simulations, we have shown that empirically plausible persistent shocks can
lead to such aggressive tax increases that debt initially falls under discretion
(compared to increasing under commitment), before returning to the steady
state.
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28Appendix 1 - Price Setting




























































This can be loglinearised as,
p∗








t is the log of the optimal price set by those ﬁrms that were able to set
price in period t, ln(µt)= ²t
²t−1 is the desired mark-up and v = −ln(1+χ).Quasi-








t+1 − at + wt − vt +l n ( µt) (125)










This can be log-linearised as,
pt =( 1− θp)p∗
t + θppt−1 (127)
Solving for p∗























−at + wt − vt +l n ( µt)
T h i sc a nb es o l v e da s ,
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1 − θpβ)(1 − θp)
θp
(−at + wt − pH,t − vt +l n ( µt)) (129)
where mc = −at + wt − pH,t − vt are the real log-linearised marginal costs of
production. In the absence of sticky prices proﬁt maximising behaviour implies,
mct = −ln(µt).
29Appendix 3 - Derivation of Welfare
In order to illustrate how this model can be utilised to generate utility-
based welfare measures to guide the optimal setting of policy we simplify the
model by ignoring wage-stickiness and adopting a competitive labour market.
(Reintroducing sticky-wages to the derivation of welfare is undertaken below).























Before considering the elements of the utility function we need to note the
following general result relating to second order approximations,
Yt − Y
Yt




t + O[3] (131)
where b Yt =l n ( Yt
Y ), O[3] represents terms that are of order higher than 3 in the
bound on the amplitude of the relevant shocks.
Suppose we take the Taylor series expansion of ln(Yt




)=l n ( 1 )+
1
Y




Y 2(Yt − Y )2 + O[3] (132)
Soving for the precentage deviation we have,
1
Y







Y 2(Yt − Y )2 + O[3] (133)
Since we are ignoring all terms of order higher than 2 we can rewrite the second
order term as follows,
1
Y









)2 + O[3] (134)
This will be used in various places in the derivation of welfare. Now consider


















(Ct − C)2 (135)
−σC
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(1 − σ)b C2
t − σ b Ctb ξt} + tip + O[3] (137)













(1 − σ)b G2
t − σ b Gtb ξt} + tip + O[3] (138)











{ b Nt +
1
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(1 + ϕ) b N2
t − σ b Ntb ξt + b Ntb ξ
N
t } + tip + O[3] (139)
Now we need to relate the labour input to output and a measure of price











It can be shown that







= b Y − a +
²t
2
vari{p(i)} + O[3] (142)
In other words, a wider dispersion of prices means that more workers are
employed to produce a given level of aggregate output/consumption. While
the ﬁrst line is straight-forward, there are several steps behind the next line.
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Using second order approximation to the national accounting identity,












t + O[3] (145)
With the steady-state subsidy in place and government spending chosen












(1 − θ) (147)















































t − σb ξt = ϕb Y ∗
t − (1 + ϕ)at + ϕb ξt (151)
and,
b C∗
t = b G∗
t (152)
where the ‘*’ denotes the eﬃcient level of that variable in the face of shocks.
From the national accounting identity the latter implies, b C∗
t = b G∗
t = b Y ∗
t .U s i n g
32the deﬁnition of the optimal level of output in the face of shocks we can eliminate
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t )2 + σ(1 − θ)(b Gt − b G∗
t)2 + ϕ(b Yt − b Y ∗
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+tip + O[3] (156)











t + t.i.p + O[3] (157)








t{σθ(b Ct − b C∗
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Welfare is the sum of quadratic terms in inﬂation, the output, consumption
and government spending gaps. Optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy will max-
imise this subject to the constraints implied by the three dynamic equations for
each country, in output, inﬂation and government debt.
33Appendix 4
The log-linearised budget constraint is given by,












b τt + b wt = ϕ b Nt + σ b Ct +b ξ
N
t (160)
Eliminating real wages from the budget constraint,




((1 + ϕ)b Yt − (1 + ϕ)at +
1
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Using the deﬁnition of eﬃcient output,
−σ b C∗
t = ϕb Y ∗
t − (1 + ϕ)at +b ξ
N
t (162)
to eliminate the term in the technology shock,
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Gapping the remaining variables,























Recall that, b C∗
t = b G∗
t = b Y ∗
t , allows us to rewrite this as,
b bt−1 − πt = βEt{b bt − πt+1} −
G
b
















b τt + σ(b Ct − b C∗
t ))
34Simplifying,
b bt−1 − πt = βEt{b bt − πt+1} −
G
b









b τt + σ(b Ct − b C∗
t ))
+b Y ∗
t [(1 − β)]
Combining shock terms,
b bt−1 − πt = βEt{b bt − πt+1} −
G
b









(b τt − b τ
∗
t)+σ(b Ct − b C∗
t )] − ft
where ft = −b Y ∗





t is a measure of the ﬁscal consequences of











we can rewrite the ﬁscal variable,












as a function of the various shocks hitting the economy which have ﬁscal con-
sequences.
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Figure 1: Response of Endogenous Variables to a 1% Technology Shock
Notes to Figure: Time period in graph in bottom left is 500 periods rather
than 30, while the graph in the bottom right cell gives the paths for debt for the
ﬁrst two periods under optimal and timeless commitment policy, respectively.
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